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I've Got An Idea
Sep. 7th, 2005 07:36 pmThe genesis of the idea was some comments around and about that blamed part of the poor response to Katrina on the deployment of Louisiana National Guardsmen to Iraq. Which got me to thinking that, well, war happens. If it were a war with more popular support, and the chips fell where they did, the only real difference is that fewer people would add it to their list of gripes against the war. The hurricane would still hit, the Guardsmen would still be overseas, etc.
(And in case anyone is wondering, the Guard is the sole reserve resource for combat arms folks for the US Army, and but for about 20,000 Marines, the sole reserve resource for ground combat folks in the US period.)
So the question occurred to me, how to make it so whatever the level of popularity of a war, more people and equipment would be available for this kind of thing. Especially with plenty of ongoing potential for all kinds of natural disasters, like Oregon's growing bulge. And I hit on something, which I don't think is a new idea, but I'd like to propose it fresh, and flesh out some of the details.
A Civil Reserve.
One weekend a month, two weeks a year, training for what we should assume is the inevitable. A "surge" force of minutemen and minutewomen, uniformed but not armed, equipped like the military but not part of it, subject to mandatory recall but not subject to foreign deployment.
Let's "wargame" this.
The Civil Reserve would be much more tightly controlled by the state. Federal involvement would be limited to Congressional creation of the Reserve, a "matching" fund where the feds and states would contribute fifty-fifty, and (let's say) access to the Department of Defense acquisitions machine by way of Army Materiel Command and TACOM to buy big trucks, Humm-vees and tracked vehicles.
States would have a freedom to spend for things that they need. Let's say armament-free amphibious assault vehicles and LCACs (big-ass air cushioned vehicles) to coastal states, and perhaps those along the big, flood-prone rivers for amphibious rescue operations. Rail-mobile equipment for the big, open, heartland states.
As far as equipment goes, it could be stockpiled in hardened bunker-type things, like we do with some of our military's prepositioned vehicles and armaments in Europe and elsewhere, which could then double as emergency shelters once the stored vehicles and supplies had been deployed.
We could have a federally-mandated force minimum, and let the maximum be set by budgetary constraints. Let's ballpark it at about 1.5 million people, or about equal to the toal number of Guardsmen and Reservists. That's 30,000 per state, divided equally, or greater than division strength in military terms. Weighted for population, we could set a state minimum (like the minimum number of congresscritters) at around 10,000. (That's ten battalions, or three regiments, the core infantry population of a Marine Division.)
Each state would have their Reserve force broken down into purpose-driven units, like the military. 301st Shelter Operations Company would be broken down into Food Service Platoon, Waste Management Platoon, Medical Platoon, and Bedding/Clothing/Perishable Supplies Platoon, with an additional Transport Section and Access Control section. We could have Field Hospital Companies, Non-Emergent and Emergent Evacuation units, Comm units, Field Mess, and so on.
Equivalents to military ranks could be used, though the Civil Reserve need not stand on ceremony as much as the military does. In the field, after all, much of the military's precious ceremony goes out the window, and there ought be nothing for the Civil Reserve but in the field. The rank equivalents would help with determining a basic pay scale, as well as provide a smooth integration interface with military units if and when they became necessary in relief operations.
For instance, the Civil Reserve would not be responsible for physical security (only, say, access control in shelters and freeway checkpoints--making sure everyone has some form of ID, and if not directing them to an Identification Verification Platoon, or some such), and if necessary, that would fall to local National Guard units. At a shelter, a company of National Guardsmen could be put under the Shelter Operations Commander, who would be a captain- or major-equivalent, giving him or her standing with the military commander and smoothing that interface.
Communications would be a critical field, of course, and it would be up to them to not only deploy emergency communications infrastructure, but also to coordinate communications between civilian police, fire, and ambulance units, as well as National Guard and other military.
Uniform and personal discipline could be a bit looser, since the need for it would not be as great as in the military, perhaps attracting a demographic or set of them that the military does not. Pacifists, homosexuals, the elderly, and the disabled could be welcomed since the various traditions and necessities of the military would not be in play. Ironically, perhaps, some of the only people not allowed into the Civil Reserve would be those whose dayjobs make them part of a state or local Emergency Response plan. No cops, paramedics, or firefighters, since the point of the Civil Reserve would be to complement, augment, and work alongside those.
But there would be a uniform, some kind of standard working clothes, and it would be worn proudly.
The Reserve would have anywhere from 200 to 1,000 "active duty" members who would run day-to-day operations, organize and implement training, keep track of administrative tasks, and run the actual mobilization when the call went out.
Mobilization could be scalabale--no need to call out your state's entire 10-50,000 "troops," like a Marine Air/Ground Task Force, which can be as small as a squad with a doc in a helicopter, or as large as 50,000 person Marine Expeditionary Force. Given the military-like structure, disparate units could integrate easily with unquestionable lines of authority.
With Federal approval, mobilized Reservists would enjoy the same protections that us military reservists have, such as a bar on employment discrimination for service, guarantee of return employment following mobilization (plus all the various stuff that falls in with that guarantee), reduced interest rates if mobilized pay falls below civilian job pay, and so on.
Mobilization would also be possible before a disaster. Some sort of imminent danger would be required, so as to keep false alarms to a minimum, but the pre-mobilization would allow Shelter Operations Companies to, for instance, set up their shelters in advance, with a built-in anticipation and capacity for the basic needs of those in need. Evacuation, search and rescue, medical and supply units could congregate in hardened shelters themselves, with their vehicles and supplies, ready to go as soon as the immediate crisis passes. In this way, your critical personnel would not be scatterd to the four winds when most needed.
Likewise, having such a large number of people in the Reserves, we could assure that simultaneous disasters could not create a much greater tragedy by pulling trained personnel from their local communities. Even if, say, Texan Civil Reserve personnel responded to Louisiana, not all of them would go, and if something happened in Texas, Oklahoma and New Mexico Civil Reservists would be able to go there--along with the remaining Texan Civil Reserve units.
Interstate loans of Civil Reserve units would not be coordinated by the federal government, but by regional command centers, state of the art facilities that would provide and incident commander with all the information he or she could possibly hope for. These facilities would be operated around the clock, again in hardened locations, to expedite aid to where it is most needed, and from which press briefings could take place, though embedding of reporters with Civil Reserve units would be ideal as well.
Oh, and closed or under-used military bases could be repurposed for the Civil Reserve. Barracks, for instance, could be mothballed in anticipation for use either as long-term evacuee housing, or shorter term processing centers, such as how Ft. Custer near Battle Creek, MI is being used this week.
Anyway, there it is, in skeletal form.
Other than Congressional disinterest, why won't this work?
Like the rebuilding of New Orleans, however, I think some creativity is called for. Building the levees higher and stronger, and firing those who dropped the ball is a band-aid, not a solution. Let's get creative and think of some solutions.
(And in case anyone is wondering, the Guard is the sole reserve resource for combat arms folks for the US Army, and but for about 20,000 Marines, the sole reserve resource for ground combat folks in the US period.)
So the question occurred to me, how to make it so whatever the level of popularity of a war, more people and equipment would be available for this kind of thing. Especially with plenty of ongoing potential for all kinds of natural disasters, like Oregon's growing bulge. And I hit on something, which I don't think is a new idea, but I'd like to propose it fresh, and flesh out some of the details.
A Civil Reserve.
One weekend a month, two weeks a year, training for what we should assume is the inevitable. A "surge" force of minutemen and minutewomen, uniformed but not armed, equipped like the military but not part of it, subject to mandatory recall but not subject to foreign deployment.
Let's "wargame" this.
The Civil Reserve would be much more tightly controlled by the state. Federal involvement would be limited to Congressional creation of the Reserve, a "matching" fund where the feds and states would contribute fifty-fifty, and (let's say) access to the Department of Defense acquisitions machine by way of Army Materiel Command and TACOM to buy big trucks, Humm-vees and tracked vehicles.
States would have a freedom to spend for things that they need. Let's say armament-free amphibious assault vehicles and LCACs (big-ass air cushioned vehicles) to coastal states, and perhaps those along the big, flood-prone rivers for amphibious rescue operations. Rail-mobile equipment for the big, open, heartland states.
As far as equipment goes, it could be stockpiled in hardened bunker-type things, like we do with some of our military's prepositioned vehicles and armaments in Europe and elsewhere, which could then double as emergency shelters once the stored vehicles and supplies had been deployed.
We could have a federally-mandated force minimum, and let the maximum be set by budgetary constraints. Let's ballpark it at about 1.5 million people, or about equal to the toal number of Guardsmen and Reservists. That's 30,000 per state, divided equally, or greater than division strength in military terms. Weighted for population, we could set a state minimum (like the minimum number of congresscritters) at around 10,000. (That's ten battalions, or three regiments, the core infantry population of a Marine Division.)
Each state would have their Reserve force broken down into purpose-driven units, like the military. 301st Shelter Operations Company would be broken down into Food Service Platoon, Waste Management Platoon, Medical Platoon, and Bedding/Clothing/Perishable Supplies Platoon, with an additional Transport Section and Access Control section. We could have Field Hospital Companies, Non-Emergent and Emergent Evacuation units, Comm units, Field Mess, and so on.
Equivalents to military ranks could be used, though the Civil Reserve need not stand on ceremony as much as the military does. In the field, after all, much of the military's precious ceremony goes out the window, and there ought be nothing for the Civil Reserve but in the field. The rank equivalents would help with determining a basic pay scale, as well as provide a smooth integration interface with military units if and when they became necessary in relief operations.
For instance, the Civil Reserve would not be responsible for physical security (only, say, access control in shelters and freeway checkpoints--making sure everyone has some form of ID, and if not directing them to an Identification Verification Platoon, or some such), and if necessary, that would fall to local National Guard units. At a shelter, a company of National Guardsmen could be put under the Shelter Operations Commander, who would be a captain- or major-equivalent, giving him or her standing with the military commander and smoothing that interface.
Communications would be a critical field, of course, and it would be up to them to not only deploy emergency communications infrastructure, but also to coordinate communications between civilian police, fire, and ambulance units, as well as National Guard and other military.
Uniform and personal discipline could be a bit looser, since the need for it would not be as great as in the military, perhaps attracting a demographic or set of them that the military does not. Pacifists, homosexuals, the elderly, and the disabled could be welcomed since the various traditions and necessities of the military would not be in play. Ironically, perhaps, some of the only people not allowed into the Civil Reserve would be those whose dayjobs make them part of a state or local Emergency Response plan. No cops, paramedics, or firefighters, since the point of the Civil Reserve would be to complement, augment, and work alongside those.
But there would be a uniform, some kind of standard working clothes, and it would be worn proudly.
The Reserve would have anywhere from 200 to 1,000 "active duty" members who would run day-to-day operations, organize and implement training, keep track of administrative tasks, and run the actual mobilization when the call went out.
Mobilization could be scalabale--no need to call out your state's entire 10-50,000 "troops," like a Marine Air/Ground Task Force, which can be as small as a squad with a doc in a helicopter, or as large as 50,000 person Marine Expeditionary Force. Given the military-like structure, disparate units could integrate easily with unquestionable lines of authority.
With Federal approval, mobilized Reservists would enjoy the same protections that us military reservists have, such as a bar on employment discrimination for service, guarantee of return employment following mobilization (plus all the various stuff that falls in with that guarantee), reduced interest rates if mobilized pay falls below civilian job pay, and so on.
Mobilization would also be possible before a disaster. Some sort of imminent danger would be required, so as to keep false alarms to a minimum, but the pre-mobilization would allow Shelter Operations Companies to, for instance, set up their shelters in advance, with a built-in anticipation and capacity for the basic needs of those in need. Evacuation, search and rescue, medical and supply units could congregate in hardened shelters themselves, with their vehicles and supplies, ready to go as soon as the immediate crisis passes. In this way, your critical personnel would not be scatterd to the four winds when most needed.
Likewise, having such a large number of people in the Reserves, we could assure that simultaneous disasters could not create a much greater tragedy by pulling trained personnel from their local communities. Even if, say, Texan Civil Reserve personnel responded to Louisiana, not all of them would go, and if something happened in Texas, Oklahoma and New Mexico Civil Reservists would be able to go there--along with the remaining Texan Civil Reserve units.
Interstate loans of Civil Reserve units would not be coordinated by the federal government, but by regional command centers, state of the art facilities that would provide and incident commander with all the information he or she could possibly hope for. These facilities would be operated around the clock, again in hardened locations, to expedite aid to where it is most needed, and from which press briefings could take place, though embedding of reporters with Civil Reserve units would be ideal as well.
Oh, and closed or under-used military bases could be repurposed for the Civil Reserve. Barracks, for instance, could be mothballed in anticipation for use either as long-term evacuee housing, or shorter term processing centers, such as how Ft. Custer near Battle Creek, MI is being used this week.
Anyway, there it is, in skeletal form.
Other than Congressional disinterest, why won't this work?
Like the rebuilding of New Orleans, however, I think some creativity is called for. Building the levees higher and stronger, and firing those who dropped the ball is a band-aid, not a solution. Let's get creative and think of some solutions.